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Abstract
The aim of the paper is to provide a clear and thorough conceptual analysis
of the main candidates for a definition of climate and climate change. Five
desiderata on a definition of climate are presented: it should be empirically
applicable, it should correctly classify different climates, it should not depend
on our knowledge, is should be applicable to the past, present and future and
it should be mathematically well-defined. Then five definitions are discussed:
climate as distribution over time for constant external conditions, climate as
distribution over time when the external conditions vary as in reality, climate as
distribution over time relative to regimes of varying external conditions, climate
as the ensemble distribution for constant external conditions, and climate as the
ensemble distribution when the external conditions vary as in reality. The third
definition is novel and is introduced as a response to problems with existing
definitions. The conclusion is that most definitions encounter serious problems
and that the third definition is most promising.
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1 Introduction
How to define climate and climate change is nontrivial and contentious, as also ex-
pressed by Todorov (1986, 259):
The question of climatic change is perhaps the most complex and con-
troversial in the entire science of meteorology. No strict criteria exist on
how many dry years should occur to justify the use of the words “climatic
change”. There is no unanimous opinion and agreement among clima-
tologists on the definition of the term climate, let alone climatic change,
climatic trend or fluctuation.
In both public and scientific discourse the notions of climate and climate change
are often loosely employed, and it remains unclear what exactly is understood by
them.1 This unclarity is problematic because it may lead to considerable confusion
regarding the existence and extent of global warming, for example. How to define
climate and climate change is conceptually interesting, but choosing good definitions
is also important for being able to make true statements about our climate system.
As we will see, adopting definitions with serious problems may imply that the climate
has nothing to do with the actual properties of the climate system, that different cli-
mates are not correctly classified or that there is no relation to observational records
such as past mean surface temperature values.
Of course, different definitions of climate and climate change are discussed in
the climate science literature. However, what is missing is a clear and thorough
conceptual analysis of the different definitions and their benefits and problems.2 This
paper aims to contribute to filling this gap. After introducing climate variables and a
simple climate model (Section 2), five main desiderata on a definition of climate will
be presented (Section 3). Then five main candidates for a definition of climate (and
the derivative definitions of climate change) will be discussed. By referring to the
five desiderata, their benefits and problems will be analysed (Sections 4-5). Problems
with existing definitions lead me to propose a novel definition of climate (Definition
3) which has not been discussed in the literature before (the other four definitions are
among the most commonly endorsed definitions of climate). Finally, the conclusion
will summarise the discussion (Section 6).
1An example for this is Stott and Kettleborough (2002).
2The most detailed discussion so far seems to be Lorenz (1995). Still, a more thorough analysis is
needed. For instance, Lorenz’s discussion does not take into account recent developments in defining
climate and in using time-dependent dynamical systems theory (where the external conditions are
allowed to vary) to define climate.
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2 Climate Variables and a Simple Climate Model
When talking about the climate of a certain region one is interested in the distribu-
tion of certain variables (called the climate variables) of that region.3 These include
the dynamic meteorological variables, i.e., the variables that describe the state of the
atmosphere, such as the surface air temperature or the surface pressure. In the liter-
ature one often finds the statement that climate is the expected weather (e.g. Allen
2003; Lorenz 1995), which suggests that the only variables of interest are the dynamic
meteorological variables. However, this is not clear. When scientists talk about cli-
mate they often refer not only to dynamic meteorological variables but to a more
extended set of variables. These usually include the variables describing the state
of the ocean (such as the sub-surface ocean temperature) and sometimes also other
variables such as those describing glaciers and ice sheets. In general, when talking
about climate, one is definitely interested in the dynamic meteorological variables,
and there are some other variables one is definitely not interested in, such as those
which describe the flora and fauna on Earth in all its details. Apart from this, there
is a middle ground of other variables such as those describing glaciers and ice sheets,
which one might only include in the list of climate variables in certain contexts. It
seems best to me to accept this middle ground. Depending on the purpose at hand,
it is better to include more or fewer variables – as climate scientists do in practice.4
When illustrating the different definitions of climate, in order for the discussion
to be as accessible as possible, it will be assumed that the following simple climate
model is the true model of the evolution of the climate variables : The only climate
variable is the temperature with possible values in [0, 30]. It evolves according to the
deterministic evolution equation
xt+1 = f(xt) =
{
atxt for 0 ≤ xt ≤ 15
at(30− xt) for 15 < xt ≤ 30, (1)
where xt denotes the temperature at day t. For this assumed true simple climate
model the external conditions (i.e. the phenomena not described by the climate vari-
ables) consist just of at. at represents the solar energy reaching the Earth at day
3Here ‘region’ is broadly understood. For instance, the region could be London (site-specific
climate) or the Earth (spatially aggregated global climate). These spatial aspects of defining climate
present further conceptual challenges, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
4The climate of a region is generated by the climate system, which is an interactive system
consisting of the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, the land surface and the biosphere,
forced or influenced by various external forcing mechanisms such as solar radiation (Solomon et
al. 2007). Note that many variables figuring in the climate system are not climate variables. For
instance, the climate system includes a detailed description of the flora and fauna on Earth, but
these details are not of concern when talking about the climate.
4
Figure 1: The assumed true simple evolution of the temperature when at=1 (left) and at=2.
(right)
t and is assumed to be periodically fluctuating between the values 1 and 2 (and
at=1 on 1 July 1983). Figure 1 shows the evolution equation when at=1 (left) and
at=2 (right). Realistic and state-of-the-art climate models are of course much more
complex deterministic models (Parker 2006; see Appendix A for a general mathemat-
ical definition of deterministic models).5 They usually arise from ordinary or partial
differential equations, implying that the time parameter t varies continuously (and
not in discrete steps as for the simple model). For the purposes of this paper these
differences are irrelevant as all the points made for the simple model carry over to
the more complex continuous-time climate models.6
3 Desiderata on a Definition of Climate
For many policy decisions and scientific questions what matters are not the specific
values of the climate variables at a certain point of time but the distribution over
the climate variables arising for a certain configuration of the climate system. For
instance, when policy advisors ask whether events of extreme heat under our current
greenhouse gas emissions will be roughly the same as under the greenhouse gas emis-
sions projected towards the end of the 21th century, they have in mind a comparison
of two temperature distributions. They are not concerned with the temperature at
certain days (such as whether there will be extreme heat on 1 July 2099).
5For a discussion of how climate models are confirmed, see Steele and Werndl (2013).
6It should be noted that, for several reasons (e.g., incomplete knowledge or the inability to
resolve processes numerically at sub-grid level), stochastic models are sometimes used to describe
the evolution of climate variables (e.g. Hasselmann 1976; Checkroun et al. 2011). Deterministic
models are the norm and thus what follows focuses on deterministic models. However, all the
definitions of climate discussed in this paper have a stochastic counterpart.
5
Furthermore, climate scientists tend to think that distributions over climate vari-
ables are easier to predict than the actual path taken by the climate variables. Thus
both in scientific and policy discourse the notion of the distribution over the climate
variables arising for a certain configuration of the climate system is needed, and at an
intuitive level the climate simply amounts to this notion. The following five desiderata
present fairly weak requirements on a more rigorous definition of this notion (these
desiderata will play a crucial role in the analysis of the five definitions of climate in
Sections 4 and 5).
Desideratum 1. A definition of climate should be empirically applicable. In par-
ticular, (i) it should be possible to estimate the past and present climate from the
time series of observations (if good records are available), and (ii) the future climate
should be about the future values of the climate variables. A definition that neither
fulfills (i) nor (ii) is called empirically void.
Desideratum 2. A definition of climate should correctly classify different climates
for time periods which are uncontroversially regarded as belonging to different cli-
mates. For instance, the climate which prevailed in the middle of the last ice age in
London is regarded as different from the climate in London in the past few years.
Therefore, a definition of climate should classify that these time periods belong to
different climates.
Desideratum 3. The climate should not depend on our knowledge. When, e.g., pol-
icy advisors ask what the past climate was and whether there will be climate change,
they do not refer to notions which would differ if we had better or worse knowledge.
How well we can predict the climate and climate change, of course, depends on our
knowledge, but what the climate is and whether there is climate change is indepen-
dent of our knowledge.
Desideratum 4. A definition of climate should be applicable to the past, present
and future. Scientists think that there were several climates in the past, that there
is a present climate and that there will be several climates in the future. Thus a
definition of climate should be applicable to all these cases. If, e.g., a definition were
only about the future climate, it would be regarded as incomplete and a definition
that can also be applied to the past and present would be demanded.
Desideratum 5. A definition of climate should be mathematically well-defined. In
particular, it cannot refer to a limit which does not exist.
As we will see, it will turn out that only one definition discussed in this paper
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Figure 2: The temperature distribution over time for the simple climate model with constant
c = 1.5 and with initial value 18.85 from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 2013.
fulfills all the desiderata and hence is a promising definition of climate. Yet this
should not be taken to imply that, in principle, there can only be one definition of
climate. Different notions of the distribution over the climate variables arising for a
certain configuration of the climate system (i.e. what climate intuitively amounts to)
might be important for different purposes. Thus it is not excluded that there could
be several definitions of climate.
Let us now turn to the five definitions of climate (and the derivative definitions
of climate change).
4 Climate as Distribution Over Time
4.1 Definition 1. Distribution Over Time for Constant Ex-
ternal Conditions
In reality the external conditions (such as the amount of solar energy at for the as-
sumed true simple evolution of the temperature) always fluctuate and thus are not
constant. Suppose that the external conditions take the form of small fluctuations
around a mean value c over a certain time period. Then, according to the first def-
inition, the climate over this time period is defined by the finite distribution over
time which arises for the true climate model under constant external conditions c.
Different distributions over time correspond to different climates. There is climate
change when there are different distributions for two successive time periods. This
can be because of different external conditions (external climate change) or because of
different initial values under constant external conditions (internal climate change).
This definition is widely endorsed (e.g. Dymnikov and Gritsoun 2001; Lorenz 1995).
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Figure 3: The actual temperature distribution over time for the assumed true simple climate
model with initial value 18.85 from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 2013.
Let me illustrate this definition with the assumed true simple evolution of the
temperature (cf. Section 2). Here the amount of solar energy reaching the Earth
fluctuated around the mean value c = 1.5 for the thirty years period from 1 July
1983 to 30 June 2013. Suppose that the initial temperature on 1 July 1983 was
18.85 ◦C. Then the climate over this period is the distribution over time which arises
when the model (1) with at = c = 1.5 (for all t) and with initial value 18.85 is evolved
over thirty years. That is, the value assigned to a set A in [0, 30] is:7
The number of days under constant external conditions c with a temperature in A
The total number of modelled days (=10950 (30∗365))
.
(2)
The distribution arising in this way is shown in Figure 2. For instance, the value
assigned to [15, 20] (that the temperature was between 15 ◦C and 20 ◦C) is 0.517.
There is a fundamental distinction between climate as a distribution or average of
actual properties of the climate system versus climate as a model-immanent notion
(a property of the true climate model). Because the external conditions are assumed
to be constant but vary in reality, Definition 1 is a model-immanent notion and
not a distribution of the actual properties of the climate system. This would not
represent a problem if this definition were empirically applicable in the following
sense: When the external conditions are small fluctuations around a mean value c,
then the distributions over time of the actual climate system are approximately equal
7The question arises how long the time period should be over which the climate distribution is
defined (cf. Subsection 4.3). Suppose that the relevant time period is thirty years. Then even if the
external conditions fluctuate around c for less than thirty years, say three years, then climate over
this time period is still defined as the distribution under constant external conditions over thirty
years. This makes intuitive sense: if, e.g., there are high temperatures over three years because of
the El Nin˜o, then this is just a warm period under a certain climate.
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to the distributions over time under constant external conditions c. However, there
are doubts about this. Let me illustrate this with the assumed true simple climate
model. The actual distribution (where the solar energy at fluctuated between 1 and
2 with at = 1 on 1 July 1983) is given by the actual evolution of the temperature over
the thirty years period from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 2013 (with initial temperature
18.85). That is, the value assigned to a set A in [0, 30] is:
The number of days of the actual climate system with a temperature in A
The total number of days (=10950 (30∗365))
. (3)
Figure 3 shows the distribution arising in this way. It is clear that the temperature
distribution over time for constant external conditions c = 1.5 (Figure 2) and the
actual temperature distribution over time (Figure 3) are completely different. For
instance, the value assigned to [15, 20] (that the temperature is between 15 ◦C and
20 ◦C) is 0.517 for the former distribution but 0.082 for the latter distribution.
Similar results can be found for several climate models. For instance, Daron
(2012) numerically investigated the Lorenz equations where one parameter is subject
to fluctuations around a mean value. He found that the finite distributions over time
can differ significantly from the distributions arising when the parameters are held
fixed. A resonance effect, which can also arise for small fluctuations, is responsible for
these different distributions. Also, there is a body of work indicating that the seasonal
cycle of the sun leads to different distributions over time. It was found in Goswami
et al. (2006) for a model of the monsoon, Jin et al. (1994) for a model of the El Nin˜o,
Lorenz (1990) for a simple general circulation model and Kurgansky et al. (1996) for
a baroclinic low-order model of the atmosphere that the finite distributions over time
are different when the seasonal cycle of the sun is included. It could certainly be that
similar results hold for the true climate model. Thus the first definition of climate
may be empirically void (thereby violating Desideratum 1). Note also that there is the
problem that when the external conditions are not small fluctuations around a mean
value c but vary considerably, then this definition is not applicable. All this shows
a need to take the varying external conditions of the climate system into account.
Thus the question arises whether a similar definition can be found where the external
conditions are allowed to vary.
4.2 Definition 2. Distribution Over Time when the External
Conditions Vary as in Reality
Most directly this can be achieved by defining the climate over a certain time period
as the finite distribution over time for the actual evolution of the climate variables
(i.e. when the external conditions vary as in reality). Again, different climates cor-
respond to different distributions. There is climate change when there are different
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Figure 4: The actual temperature distribution over time for the meteor scenario from 1
July 1000 to 30 June 1030.
distributions for succeeding time periods (and there can be external climate change
as well as internal climate change due to different initial values for the same external
conditions). To come back to the assumed true simple evolution of the temperature
(cf. Section 2): here the climate for the time period from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 2013
is the temperature distribution (3) as shown in Figure 3.
This definition simply refers to a distribution of actual properties of the climate
system (so, unlike Definition 1, it is not a model-immanent notion). Because of this,
arguably, there could be no definition of climate that is easier to estimate from the
observations. For this reason, it is very popular and implicitly employed in many
climate studies (cf. Lorenz 1995). The World Meteorological Organisation publishes
standard climate normals that are statistics taken over a period of thirty years (most
recently from 1961 to 1990). Thus the climate is commonly identified with the actual
distribution of the atmosphere over a period of thirty years (cf. Hulme et al. 2009).
However, there is a serious problem with this definition, which can best be illus-
trated with a simple hypothetical scenario. Suppose that the time period from 1 July
1000 to 30 June 1030 was marked by two different regimes because on 1 July 1015
the Earth was hit by a meteor and, as a consequence, became a colder place with
less temperature variation. More specifically, suppose again that the only climate
variable is the temperature and that before the hit of the meteor the evolution of the
temperature was given by equation (1) where at fluctuates periodically between 1.8
and 2 (with at = 1.8 and initial temperature 23.249 on 1 July 1000). After the hit of
the meteor the evolution was given by equation (1) where at fluctuates periodically
between 1 and 1.2 (with at = 1 on 1 July 1015).
According to this second definition, climate is defined as the actual temperature
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Figure 5: The actual temperature distribution over time before (from 1 July 1000 to 30
June 1015, left) and after the hit of the meteor (from 1 July 1015 to 30 June 1030, right).
distribution over the thirty years period from 1 July 1000 to 30 June 1030 as shown
in Figure 4. However, Figure 5 reveals that this distribution is composed of two
distributions: the actual temperature distribution over time before the hit of the
meteor (from 1 July 1000 to 30 June 1015) and after the hit of the meteor (from
1 July 1015 to 30 June 1030). These two distributions are very different, e.g., the
value assigned to [25, 30] (that the temperature was between 25 ◦C and 30 ◦C) is
0.142 for the former but zero for latter distribution. Because a change in external
conditions is responsible for these different distributions, one would like to say that
the climate before and after the hit of the meteor differ. Yet, the second definition
does not imply this because the climate is simply the actual distribution over the
thirty years period. To put it differently, the external conditions may well change
drastically over the time period for which the climate distribution is defined. Hence
the second definition suffers from the shortcoming that it does not correctly classify
different climates for time periods which are uncontroversially regarded as belonging
to different climates (thereby violating Desideratum 2 ).
4.3 Definition 3. Distribution Over Time for Regimes of
Varying External Conditions
To avoid this problem, a promising possibility seems to be a slight modification of
the second definition. Namely, suppose that the actual external conditions over a
time period are subject to a certain regime of varying external conditions. Then
the climate over this time period is defined as the finite distribution over time which
arises under the regime of varying external conditions. Some thoughts need to be
given on what counts as a regime of varying external conditions. For instance, a
reasonable requirement is that the mean of the external conditions should at least be
approximately constant. To my knowledge, this definition is novel and has not been
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explicitly endorsed in the climate literature. Again, different climates correspond
to different distributions. There is climate change when there are different climates
for two successive time periods, and there can be external climate change as well as
internal climate change (due to different initial values).
Let me illustrate this definition with the assumed true simple evolution of the
temperature (cf. Section 2). A regime of varying external conditions is when the
solar energy fluctuates periodically between 1 and 2 (starting with 1), and the solar
energy was subject to this regime from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 2013. Thus the climate
over this period is the distribution over time under this regime of varying external
conditions (with initial temperature 18.85).8 That is, a set A in [0, 30] is assigned
the value:
The number of days under the external conditions regime with a temperature in A
The total number of modelled days (=10950 (30∗365))
.
(4)
Since the regime of varying external conditions coincides with the actual path taken
by the external conditions from 1 July 1983 to 30 June 2013, the third definition of
climate is simply given by the distribution shown in Figure 3.
This definition avoids the shortcoming of the second definition of not being able
to correctly classify different climates. For instance, the external conditions before
and after the hit of the meteor correspond to two different regimes of varying exter-
nal conditions (namely, the solar energy reaching the Earth fluctuating periodically
between 1.8 and 2 starting with 1.8 (first regime), and the solar energy fluctuating
periodically between 1 and 1.2, starting with 1 (second regime)). Thus, as desired,
the climate before and after the hit of the meteor differ, i.e. the two distributions
shown in Figure 5 correspond to different climates.
This definition of climate is a model-immanent notion and not a distribution of
actual properties of the climate system. This does not represent a problem because
the definition is empirically applicable: when the actual climate system is subject to
a certain regime of varying external conditions over a long-enough time period, then
the climate of this time period coincides with the distribution over time of the actual
evolution of the climate variables. Hence this definition is attractive because there is
8The question arises how long the time period should be over which the climate distribution is
defined (cf. the comments at the end of this subsection). Suppose that the relevant time period is
thirty years. Then even if the external conditions are subject to a certain regime of varying external
conditions for less than thirty years, say three years, then climate over this time period is still
defined as the distribution under the regime over thirty years (e.g., if there are high temperatures
over three years because of the El Nin˜o, then this is just a warm period under a certain climate).
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an immediate link to the observations.
Since this definition is promising, let me comment on a few issues (which also
arise for Definition 1 and 2). First, there is the question over which finite time period
the distributions should be taken. It seems promising to adopt a pragmatic approach
as outlined by Lorenz (1995): The purpose of research will influence the choice of
the time interval, e.g., if one is interested in inter-glacial climate the time period will
be relatively long. Also, the time period should be long enough so that no specific
predictions can be made (e.g., longer than the predictability horizon given by the El
Nin˜o) but short enough to ensure that changes which are conceived as climatic are
subsumed under different climates. What is important is to provide some motivation
for the chosen time period (often thirty years are chosen without any clear motiva-
tion, which is problematic). Second, it should be mentioned that there will nearly
always be climate change. Yet this does not constitute a problem: pragmatically
one might say that of interest is only more major climate change with significantly
different distributions. Third, the climate depends on the initial value of the climate
variables, e.g., for the very simple model on the initial temperature. This does not
speak against this definition but implies that predicting the climate would be difficult
if small changes in the initial values led to very different distributions.9
To sum up the discussion of climate as a finite distribution over time: Because of
the assumption of constant external conditions, Definition 1 may be empirically void
(thereby violating Desideratum 1). Definition 2 does not correctly classify different
climates and thus fails to meet Desideratum 2. In contrast, Definition 3 is promising
because it meets all the desiderata.
4.4 Infinite Versions
There are also infinite versions of the three definitions of climate as distribution over
time discussed above. According to these infinite versions, the climate is defined by
the infinite distribution over time when the time period in equation (2) (for Definition
1), equation (3) (for Definition 2) or equation (4) (for Definition 3) goes to infinity.
According to the infinite version of Definition 2, the climate is the actual distribution
of the climate system as time goes to infinity, which has the consequence that there
cannot be climate change. Because of this, it is hardly ever adopted. The infinite
versions of Definition 1 and Definition 3, however, are widely endorsed (Dymnikov
and Gritsoun 2001; Lorenz 1995; Palmer 1999).
9Note also that the climate of the true model may differ significantly from the climate of models
which are close to the true model (Frigg et al. 2013). While this does not speak against this
definition, this would make predicting the climate very difficult.
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The main advantage of these infinite distributions is that they are mathematically
more tractable, implying that the tools of dynamical systems theory can be used to
analyse them. For instance, recall that climate as distribution over time is defined
relative to the initial values of the climate variables. For the infinite version of Defi-
nition 1 results of dynamical systems theory show that under certain conditions the
climate is the same for almost all initial values (no corresponding results are known
for Definition 2 and Definition 3). Namely, this is the case when the dynamics is
ergodic or when there is a physical measure (see Appendix B for a mathematical
statement of these results). These results are of limited relevance, however, because
it is unclear whether the true climate model under constant external conditions is
ergodic or has a physical measure. What is more, as I will now argue, the infinite
versions of Definitions 1, 2 and 3 suffer from serious problems (in addition to the
problems already outlined in the Subsections 4.1-4.3). Therefore, for defining the cli-
mate, finite distributions over time are preferable to infinite distributions over time
(and this is the reason why the presentation above focused on finite distributions).
The first problem with these infinite versions is that the relevant infinite limits
may not exist. More specifically, while infinite limits of equation (2) (Definition 1)
usually exist (Petersen 1983), the infinite limits of equation (3) (Definition 2) and
equation (4) (Definition 3) often do not exist (Mancho et al. 2013). To the best of
my knowledge, it is an open question whether they exist for the true climate model.
Hence there is the problem that the climate may not be mathematically well-defined
(thereby violating Desideratum 5).10
Second, to make sure that the infinite distributions relate to the actual finite dis-
tributions of the climate system, one has to assume that the distributions over finite
time periods of interest are approximated by the infinite distributions. However,
there are doubts about this. For many climate models the convergence to the infinite
distributions is very slow. In particular, Lorenz (1968) introduced the notion of al-
most intransitivity to describe systems where distributions taken over very long but
finite time intervals differ from one interval to each other and thus from the infinite
distribution. Lorenz (1968, 1970, 1976, 1995) gave examples of simple models that
10Furthermore, when the external conditions vary, i.e., for equation (3) (Definition 2) and equation
(4) (Definition 3), there are two infinite distributions, which usually differ. More specifically, when
the finite distributions range from time point t0 to time point t1, one infinite distribution arises for
t0 → −∞ and the other for t1 → ∞ (Kloeden and Rasmussen 2011). Consequently, there is the
problem which of the infinite distributions should be identified with the climate. For the past one
can check which infinite distribution is approximated by the observed distributions. However, if
the concern is the future, it is unclear how to choose between the two distributions. If the wrong
distribution is chosen, the climate will be empirically void (thereby violating Desideratum 1).
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show almost intransitive behaviour. He concluded that the true climate model may
well be almost intransitive, particularly when the climate variables include the ocean
variables. Furthermore, there are several climate models that incorporate some real-
ism about the evolution of the climate variables where the distributions taken over
long finite time intervals differ considerably from the infinite distributions. For in-
stance, Bhattacharya et al. (1982) for an energy-balance model, Daron (2012) and
Daron and Stainforth (2013) for a coupled ocean-atmosphere model and Sempf et
al. (2007) for a model of the wintertime atmospheric circulation over the northern
hemisphere found considerable differences between distributions taken over long fi-
nite intervals and distributions in the infinite limit. It is an open question whether
similar results hold for the true climate model, but there remains the worry that the
infinite distributions may not relate to the actual distributions of the climate system
and thus are empirically void (thereby violating Desideratum 1).
To sum up: climate as an infinite distribution over time is easier to analyse
mathematically. However, there are the additional problems that the relevant limits
may not exist (thereby violating Desideratum 5) and that the definitions may be
empirically void (thereby violating Desideratum 1).
5 Climate as Ensemble Distribution
5.1 Definition 4. Ensemble Distribution for Constant Exter-
nal Conditions
The first three definitions of climate are distributions over time. In stark contrast to
this, the remaining two definitions are ensemble distributions of the possible values of
the climate variables. Suppose that the concern is to make predictions at time t1 in
the future and that from the present t0 until t1 the external conditions take the form
of small fluctuations around a mean value c. Then, according to the fourth definition,
the climate at time t1 is the distribution of the possible values of the climate variables
at t1 under constant external conditions c conditional on our uncertainty in the initial
values at t0. As before, different distributions correspond to different climates. This
is a common definition (e.g., Lorenz 1995; Stone and Knutti 2010).
Let me illustrate this definition with the assumed true simple evolution of the
temperature (cf. Section 2). Suppose that the temperature is measured to be between
29.77 ◦C and 30.00 ◦C degrees today, i.e. at t0 = 1 July 2013. Let pt0 be the uniform
probability density over [29.77, 30.00] representing this uncertainty in the initial
temperature. Further, suppose that the concern is to predict the temperature at
time t1 = 1 July 2040. The amount of solar energy reaching the Earth will fluctuate
15
Figure 6: The temperature ensemble distribution on 1 July 2040 for the simple climate
model under constant c = 1.5 given the uncertainty about the initial temperature on 1 July
2013.
around the mean value c = 1.5 from 1 July 2013 to 1 July 2040. Hence the climate
on 1 July 2040 is given by the distribution where the value of a set A in [0, 30] is
P ct0,t1(A), (5)
where P ct0,t1(A) is the value assigned to A by the density that arises when pt0 is evolved
forward to 30 June 2040 under equation (1) with at = c = 1.5 (for all t). Figure 6
shows the distribution arising in this way. For instance, the value assigned to [20, 25]
(that the temperature will be between 20 ◦C and 25 ◦C) is 0.241.
Clearly, this definition is a model-immanent notion since it refers to an ensem-
ble of initial conditions that is evolved forward in time but actual initial conditions
are unique. Proponents of this definition think that this model-immanent notion is
predictively useful in the following sense: What one is interested in is the actual
ensemble distribution at time t1, i.e. the distribution over the possible values of the
climate variables given the uncertainty in the initial values and the actual path of
the external conditions taken by the climate system. So the assumption is made
that when the external conditions take the form of small fluctuations around a mean
value c from t0 to t1, then the ensemble distribution at time t1 under constant external
conditions c is approximately the same as the actual ensemble distribution at time t1.
However, there are doubts about this assumption. Let me illustrate this with the
assumed true simple climate model. The actual temperature ensemble distribution
is shown in Figure 7. It is the distribution where the value of a set A in [0, 30] is
Pt0,t1(A), (6)
where Pt0,t1(A) is the value assigned to A by the density that arises when pt0 is
evolved forward to 1 July 2040 under equation (1) given the periodic fluctuations of
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Figure 7: The actual temperature ensemble distribution on 1 July 2040 for the simple
climate model given the uncertainty about the initial temperature on 1 July 2013.
the solar energy at between 1 and 2 (with at = 1 on 1 July 2013). It is clear that
the ensemble distribution for constant external conditions c = 1.5 (Figure 6) and the
actual ensemble distribution (Figure 7) are very different. For instance, the value
assigned to [20, 25] (that the temperature will be between 20 ◦C and 25 ◦C) is 0.241
for the former but 0 for the latter distribution.11
Similar results hold for several climate models. For instance, Daron (2012) nu-
merically investigated the Lorenz equations where one parameter is subject to fluc-
tuations around a mean value. He found that the ensemble distributions can differ
significantly from the ensemble distributions when the parameters are held fixed. The
mechanism responsible for the different distributions is a resonance effect, which can
also arise for small fluctuations. Also, there is growing evidence that the inclusion
of the seasonal cycle of the sun may lead to different ensemble distributions: it was
found in Gowsami et al. (2006) for model of the monsoon, in Jin et al. (1994) for a
model of the El Nin˜o and in Lorenz (1990) for a very simple general circulation model
that the ensemble distributions differ when the seasonal cycle of the sun is included.
It is certainly possible that similar results hold for the true climate model. Hence
there is the problem that this definition of climate may be empirically void (thereby
violating Desideratum 1). There is also the additional problem that when the exter-
nal conditions are not small fluctuations around a mean value, then the definition is
not applicable. All this shows the need to take the varying external conditions into
account.
11Note that the actual ensemble distribution on 30 June 2040 is given by the uniform distribution
over [0, 30]. Thus the ensemble distribution under constant external conditions c = 1.5 (Figure 6)
is not the average of the ensemble distribution on 1 July 2040 (where at = 2) and the ensemble
distribution on 30 June 2040 (where at = 1). That is, it is not the average of the ensemble
distributions for the periodically fluctuating external conditions.
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5.2 Definition 5. Ensemble Distribution when the External
Conditions Vary as in Reality
Most directly this can be achieved by defining the climate as the actual ensemble
distribution. More specifically, suppose again that the concern is to make predictions
at time t1 in the future. According to the fifth definition, the climate at time t1 is
the distribution of the possible values of the climate variables at t1 given the actual
path taken by the external conditions and conditional on our uncertainty in the initial
values at t0. As before, different distributions correspond to different climates. This
definition is widely endorsed (Daron 2012; Daron and Stainforth 2013; Smith 2002).
To illustrate this definition with the assumed true simple evolution of the tempera-
ture (cf. Section 2): The climate on 1 July 2040 conditional on our knowledge that
the temperature was between 29.77 ◦C and 30.00 ◦C on 1 July 2013 is the ensemble
distribution (6) as shown in Figure 7.
Definition 5 is again a model-immanent notion since it refers to an ensemble of
initial conditions that is evolved forward in time but actual initial conditions are
unique. This model-immanent notion is predictively very useful because it quantifies
the likelihood of the future possible properties of the actual climate system given our
present uncertainty in the initial values.
However, there are several problems (which also arise for Definition 4). First of
all, climate is defined relative to our present uncertainty about the initial values. This
implies that the climate and the derivative notion of climate change are dependent
on our knowledge and that Desideratum 3 is not met.
Second, this definition is always presented as defining the future climate. So the
question arises what the past and present climate amount to (which are also needed
to define climate change). While I have not found anything in print about this, it
seems natural to say that the climate on 1 July 2013 is the distribution that scien-
tists on, say, 1 July 1983 would have predicted as the climate of 1 July 2013 based on
their uncertainty about the initial values on 1 July 1983 and the actual path taken
by the external conditions.12 Climate change is then defined as the change between
the present and the future climate. Next to external climate change there is also
internal climate change (because of different uncertainties in the initial values or dif-
ferent prediction lead-times). In the example the climate of 1 July 2013 is defined
by choosing the reference point thirty years in the past (i.e. a prediction lead-time
of thirty years), but this choice seems arbitrary. One could argue that pragmatic
12This has also been suggested by the climate scientist David Stainforth (personal communica-
tion).
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considerations as discussed in Subsection 4.3 will fix a suitable prediction lead-time,
say 30 years. Yet, then the same prediction lead-time should be used when defining
the future climate. However, this is undesirable because for the future climate the
prediction lead-time should only be determined by how many years scientists want
to predict in the future (and should not be constrained to, say, 30 years). So it is
difficult to see how the present and past climate could be defined. Hence Definition
4 is not applicable to the past, present and future and Desideratum 4 is violated.
Third, there is the problem that climate, thus defined, does not have anything
to do with distributions over time of actual properties of the climate system (cf.
Schneider and Dickinson 2000). This leaves us in the awkward situation that the
observational records of past temperatures etc. do not tell us anything about climate
and climate change. Therefore, Desideratum 1 is not met.
To sum up the discussion of climate as future ensemble distribution: Because of
the assumption of constant external conditions, Definition 4 may be empirically void
(thereby violating Desideratum 1). While Definition 5 avoids this shortcoming, there
are several other problems (which also arise for Definition 4). Namely, the climate
depends on our knowledge about the initial values (thereby violating Desideratum
3). Also, it is unclear how the past and present climate could be defined, and thus
Desideratum 4 is not met. Finally, there is no relation to the past observations of
the climate system, and thus Desideratum 1 is violated. Given all these problems, it
seems better to say that Definition 5 is not about the climate but just refers to the
expected future distribution of the climate variables (a distribution which is useful
to consider for predictive purposes).13
5.3 Infinite Versions
There are also infinite versions of the two ensemble distributions of climate just dis-
cussed. According to these infinite versions, the climate is defined as the infinite
distribution which arises when the prediction lead-time in equation (5) (for Defini-
tion 4) or equation (6) (for Definition 5) goes to infinity. These infinite versions are
popular definitions (e.g. Checkroun et al. 2011; Stone et al. 2009).
The main advantage of these infinite versions is that they are mathematically more
tractable, and, as a consequence, dynamical systems theory can be used to analyse
13One could also introduce an ensemble definition for regimes of varying external conditions (cor-
responding to Definition 3). The need for Definition 3 arose because it avoids a serious problem
encountered by Definition 2 (that different climates are not classified correctly). No problems are
avoided by introducing an ensemble definition for regimes of varying external conditions (compared
to Definition 5). Hence there is no need for such a definition.
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them. Let me give two examples for this. First, recall that climate as the future en-
semble distribution is defined relative to the present uncertainty in the initial values.
For the infinite versions conditions are known under which the infinite ensemble dis-
tribution is the same for any arbitrary uncertainty in the initial values (then climate
does not depend on our uncertainty and Desideratum 3 is not violated). Namely, this
is the case when the dynamics is mixing or when there is a strong physical measure
(for the infinite version of Definition 4), or when there is a time-dependent strong
physical measure (for the infinite version of Definition 5) (see Appendix C for a math-
ematical statement of these results). As nice as these results are, their relevance is
unclear because it is unknown whether the true climate model under constant exter-
nal conditions is mixing or has a strong physical measure, or whether the true climate
dynamics has a time-dependent strong physical measure (cf. Daron 2012).
Second, recall that the climate as the future ensemble distribution does not seem
to have anything to do with the time series of past observations. For the infinite
version of Definition 4 it can be shown that when the dynamics is mixing or has a
strong physical measure, then the infinite ensemble distribution and the infinite dis-
tribution over time are the same for almost all initial conditions (note that there are
no corresponding results for Definition 514). Hence if distributions over finite long
time periods approximate the distribution over an infinite time period, the infinite
ensemble distribution can be estimated from the observations and Desideratum 1 is
not violated (see Appendix D for a mathematical statement of these results). How-
ever, again, the relevance of these results is unclear because it is unknown whether
the true climate model under constant external conditions is mixing or has a strong
physical measure (and whether distributions over finite long time periods approxi-
mate the distributions over an infinite time period – cf. Subsection 4.4).
What speaks against the infinite versions of Definitions 4 and 5 is that they suf-
fer from several shortcomings (in addition to the ones already outlined in Subsec-
tions 5.1-5.2). Consequently, for defining the climate finite ensemble distributions
are preferable to infinite ensemble distributions, and for this reason the discussion
above concentrated on finite distributions. More specifically, there is the problem
that the infinite limits defining the infinite ensemble distributions may not exist, im-
plying that Desideratum 5 may not be met (Lasota and Mackey 1985; Provatas and
Mackey 1991). To my knowledge, it is unknown whether these limits exist for the
true climate model.15
14There cannot be any corresponding results for Definition 5: Because the external conditions
vary, the infinite ensemble distributions vary with time but the infinite distributions over time do
not. Hence the infinite ensemble distributions cannot be equal to the infinite distributions over time.
15For Definition 5 where the external conditions vary (i.e. for equation (6)) there is the additional
problem that there are two infinite limits: one for t0 → −∞ and one for t1 → ∞ (the latter limits
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Furthermore, in order for the infinite ensemble distribution to be predictively use-
ful, one has to assume that the ensemble distribution at time point t1 (what is of
concern in practice) is approximated by the infinite ensemble distribution. However,
there are doubts about this. For several models that incorporate some realism about
the evolution of the climate variables (including models with constant and varying
external conditions) the finite ensemble distributions only converge very slowly to
the infinite ensemble distributions (cf. Smith 2002). For instance, for the coupled
ocean-atmosphere model investigated by Daron (2012) and Daron and Stainforth
(2013) there is convergence only after 100 model years. Further, if the true climate
model turned out to be almost intransitive, the convergence could be very slow (Bhat-
tacharya et al. 1982; Sempf et al. 2007). Whether for the true climate model the finite
ensemble distributions for predictions lead-times of interest are approximated by the
infinite ensemble distributions is unknown, but there remains the worry that the in-
finite ensemble distribution may be empirically void (thereby violating Desideratum 1).
To conclude: defining climate as an infinite ensemble distribution makes the math-
ematical analysis of climate more tractable. However, there are the additional prob-
lems that the relevant limits may not exist (implying that Desideratum 5 may not be
met) and that the definitions may be empirically void (implying that Desideratum 1
may not be met).
6 Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to provide a clear and thorough analysis of the main candi-
dates for a definition of climate and climate change. Five definitions were discussed:
climate as the finite distribution of the climate variables over time for constant exter-
nal conditions (Definition 1), climate as the finite distribution of the climate variables
over time when the external conditions vary as in reality (Definition 2), climate as the
finite distribution of the climate variables over time relative to a regime of varying
external conditions (Definition 3), climate as the ensemble distribution of the climate
variables for constant external conditions (Definition 4), and climate as the ensemble
distribution of the climate variables when the external conditions vary as in reality
(Definition 5). Definition 3 is a novel contribution of this paper and was proposed
as a response to problems with existing definitions. The other four definitions are
among the most commonly endorsed definitions of climate.
exist only very rarely, cf. Kloeden and Rasmussen 2011). If both limits exist, they usually differ.
Hence the question arises which of them should be identified with the climate, and it is unclear how
to answer this question.
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A definition of climate should be empirically applicable (Desideratum 1), it should
correctly classify different climates (Desideratum 2), it should not depend on our
knowledge (Desideratum 3), it should be applicable to the past, present and future
(Desideratum 4) and it should be mathematically well-defined (Desideratum 5). The
discussion has shown that only Definition 3 (where climate is the finite distribution
over time under a certain regime of varying external conditions) meets all the desider-
ata and hence is the most promising definition.
This can also be seen as follows. The Definition 2 is unattractive because it does
not classify different climates correctly (i.e., Desideratum 2 is not met). Definitions
of climate where the external conditions vary as in reality are preferable to definitions
where the external conditions are held constant because the latter may be empiri-
cally void (thereby violating Desideratum 1). Distributions over time are preferable
to ensemble distributions because for the latter the climate depends on our knowledge
(thereby violating Desideratum 3), it is unclear how to define the past and present
climate (thereby violating Desideratum 4) and there is no relation to the observa-
tional record (thereby violating Desideratum 1). Given this, Definition 3 comes out
as the most promising definition.
Infinite versions of Definitions 1-5 were also discussed. They were quickly dis-
missed since they suffer from the additional problems that they may be empirically
void (thereby not meeting Desideratum 1) and that the relevant limits may not exist
(thereby not meeting Desideratum 2).
Finally, we are now in the position to look at the characterisation of climate given
by the influential report of the IPCC (Solomon et al. 2007, 942):
Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or
more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and
variability of relevant quantities over a time period ranging from months
to thousands or millions of years. The classical period for averaging these
variables is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion. The relevant quantities are most often surface variables such as
temperature, precipitation and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the
state, including a statistical description, of the climate system.
This characterisation is vague and ambiguous. ‘Climate in a narrow sense’ may be
intended to refer to the distributions of a more limited set of climate variables and
‘climate in a wider sense’ to the distributions of a more extended set of climate vari-
ables (cf. Section 2). Apart from this, ‘climate in a narrow sense’ seems to refer to a
distribution over time, i.e. to Definition 1, 2 or 3. The most direct interpretation is
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that it refers to the finite distribution over time for the actual path of the external
conditions (i.e. Definition 2, which, as argued, is unattractive). ‘Climate in a wider
sense’ is even more open to different interpretations and could in principle be inter-
preted as referring to any of the definitions discussed in this paper.
In any case, the vagueness may well be intended to subsume under one charac-
terisation the various different definitions of climate. Still, I hope that this paper
has raised awareness of the importance of choosing a good definition of climate. In
this way conceptual confusion and wrong statements about our climate system can
hopefully be avoided.
Appendix
A. Deterministic Models
Climate models are deterministic models (X,ΣX , T (x, t0, t)) of the evolution of the
climate variables. Here the set X represents all possible values of the climate vari-
ables, the σ-algebra ΣX represents all subsets of X of interest, and T (x, t0, t) :
X × Z × Z → X (the dynamics) is a measurable function such that T (x, t0, t0) = x
and T (x, t0, t + s) = T (T (x, t0, t), t, s) for all t0, t, s and x.
16 Intuitively speaking,
T (x, t0, t) gives one the value of the climate variables at time t when x is the value
at time t0. The solution when x is the initial value of the climate variables at t0
is the function Tx,t0(t) : Z → X, Tx,t0(t) = T (x, t0, t). These deterministic models
are time-dependent, and the recently developed theory of time-dependent dynamical
systems is needed to analyse them (cf. Kloeden and Rasmussen 2011).
If the governing equations do not depend on time, the models are time-independent
and one is in the realm of classical dynamical systems theory. Then the reference
to t0 can be omitted because all that matters is the evolved time period t between
two values of the climate variables. That is, the solution through x is the function
Tx(t) = T (x, t), where T (x, t) gives the value of the climate variables that started in
x after t time steps. Suppose that the functions Tt : X → X, Tt(x) = T (x, t), are
bijective for all t and that there is a probability measure µ on X which is invariant,
i.e.
µ(T (A, t)) = µ(A) for all A ∈ ΣX and all t ∈ Z. (7)
Then (X,ΣX , T (x, t), µ) is a measure-preserving deterministic model (cf. Petersen
1983).
16If T (x, t0, t) is defined only on X×Z×Z∩[t0,∞), then the dynamics is non-invertible (as opposed
to the usual case in climate science when the dynamics is invertible, i.e. defined on X ×Z×Z). All
that is stated in the Appendix can be easily adapted to carry over to a non-invertible dynamics.
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B. Independence from the Initial Conditions for the Infinite
Version of Definition 1
For the infinite version of Definition 1 there are two cases where the dependence on the
initial conditions is very weak (thus many argue that, pragmatically speaking, there
is no dependence – cf. Lorenz 1970, 1995). First, a measure-preserving deterministic
model (X,ΣX , T (x, t), µ) is ergodic iff for all A ∈ ΣX
lim
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
χA(Tt(x)) = µ(A) (8)
for any x ∈ B with µ(B) = 1 (cf. Petersen 1983).17 Ergodicity immediately implies
that the value assigned to any set A by the infinite version of Definition 1 is the same
for almost all x (i.e. those in B).
The second result is about attractors Ω which are invariant18 sets Ω ⊆ X ⊆ Rn
that attract all initial values in X, i.e., limt→∞ dist(Tt(x),Ω) = 0 for all x ∈ X. A
measure µΩ on Ω is called a physical measure iff for Lebesgue-almost all
19 x ∈ X
lim
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
χA(Tt(x)) = µΩ(A), (9)
whenever µΩ(δA) = 0 where δA denotes the boundary of A (cf. Eckmann and Ruelle
1985; Ruelle 1976). Hence for a physical measure the value assigned to any A ∈ ΣX
with µΩ(δA) = 0 by the infinite version of Definition 1 is the same for Lebesgue-almost
all initial values.
C. Independence from the Uncertainty in the Initial Values
for the Infinite Versions of Definitions 4 and 5
The independence result for the infinite version of Definition 4 holds under two con-
ditions. First, a measure-preserving deterministic model (X,ΣX , T (x, t), µ) is mixing
iff for all probability densities pt0 (relative to µ) and all sets A ∈ ΣX (Petersen 1983;
Werndl 2009a; Werndl 2009b):20
lim
t1→∞
P ct0,t1(A) = µ(A). (10)
17χ(A) is the characteristic function, i.e. χ(x) = 1 for x ∈ A and 0 otherwise.
18That is, Tt(Ω) = Ω for all t ∈ Z.
19That is, for all x ∈ Y , Y ⊆ X, with λ(X \ Y ) = 0, where λ is the Lebesgue measure.
20Since all that matters is the evolved time period, the limit could equally be taken for t0 → −∞.
24
Mixing immediately implies that the measure assigned to a set by the infinite version
of Definition 4 is the same for all initial densities pt0 and hence there is no dependence
on the uncertainty.21
Second, a measure µΩ on the attractor Ω is called strongly physical iff for any
density pt0 (relative to the Lebesgue measure λ) on X and for any set A ∈ ΣX :22
lim
t1→∞
P ct0,t1(A) = µ
Ω(A), (11)
whenever µΩ(δA) = 0 where δA denotes the boundary of A (cf. Ruelle 1976; Tasaki
et al. 1998). Here the dependence on the uncertainty in the initial values is negligible
in the sense that the measure assigned to any A with µΩ(δA) = 0 by the infinite
version of Definition 4 is the same for all initial uncertainties.
The independence result for the infinite version of Definition 5 holds when t1 →
∞23 and when there are time-dependent strong physical measures. To define them,
the following definition is needed. A pullback attractor Ω ⊆ Z × Rn is an invariant
set24 where for all initial values x ∈ X
lim
t0→−∞
dist(T (x, t0, t),Ω(t)) = 0. (12)
Time-dependent strong physical measures µΩt defined on Ω(t), t ∈ Z, where Ω is a
pullback attractor are defined by the condition that for any t and t0, any initial
density pt0 (relative to the Lebesgue measure λ) on X and for any set A ∈ ΣX (cf.
Buzzi 1999):
lim
t0→−∞
Pt0,t1(A) = µ
Ω
t (A), (13)
whenever µΩt (δA) = 0 (δA denotes the boundary of A). Hence for time-dependent
strong physical measures the dependence on the uncertainty is negligible because the
measure assigned to a set A with µΩt (δA) = 0 by the infinite version of Definition 5
is the same for all initial uncertainties.
21One might ask when the stronger condition holds that any initial probability density pt0 con-
verges to the measure µ in the sense that limt1→∞
∫
X
|1− pct0,t1 |dµ = 0, where pct0,t1 is the density
that arises when pt0 is evolved forward to t1. Most climate models are invertible (cf. footnote 16).
In this case the stronger condition cannot hold because the measure is invariant. For non-invertible
models (X,ΣX , T (x, t), µ) this condition holds iff they are exact, i.e. when limt→∞ µ(T (A, t)) = 1
for all A ∈ ΣX with µ(A) > 0 (Berger 2001; Lasota and Mackey 1985). Exactness is a stronger
condition than mixing. It is unclear whether realistic non-invertible climate models are exact.
22Since all that matters is the evolved time period, the limit could equally be taken for t0 → −∞.
23Recall that there are two possible infinite limits for the infinite version of Definition 5 (cf.
footnote 15).
24That is, Ω(t) = T (Ω(t0), t0, t) for all t, t0 ∈ Z, where Ω(t) := {x ∈ Rn | (t, x) ∈ Ω}.
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D. Relation to Infinite Distributions Over Time for the Infi-
nite Version of Definition 4
For the infinite version of Definition 4 two conditions are known which relate infi-
nite ensemble distributions to infinite distributions over time. First, if the measure-
preserving deterministic system (X,ΣX , T (x, t), µ) is mixing, equations (10) and (8)
imply that for any initial probability density pt0 and any set A ∈ ΣX
lim
t1→∞
P ct0,t1(A) = µ(A) = limk→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
χA(Tt(x)) (14)
for all initial values x ∈ B with µ(B) = 1. Hence the measure assigned to a set A by
the infinite ensemble distribution and the infinite distribution over time is the same
for almost all initial values (i.e. those in B).
Second, for an attractor Ω with a strong physical measure µΩ equations (11) and
(9) imply that for any initial density pt0 , any set A with µ
Ω(δA) = 0 and Lebesgue-
almost all initial values x ∈ X:
lim
t1→∞
P ct0,t1(A) = µ
Ω(A) = lim
k→∞
1
k
k−1∑
t=0
χA(Tt(x)). (15)
Hence the measure assigned to a set A with µΩ(δA) = 0 by the infinite ensemble
distribution and the infinite distribution over time is the same for Lebesgue-almost
all initial values.
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